We investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an experiment where emotions are measured through self-reports. The choice problem concerns the investment of an amount of money in a safe option and a risky option when there is a "global risk" of losing all earnings, from both options, including any return from the risky option. Our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option. This result cannot be explained by classical Expected Utility or by its main contenders Rank-Dependent Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. An explanation is offered by taking account of emotions, using the emotion data from the experiment and recent psychological findings. We also find that people invest less if own earnings are at stake, compared to money obtained as an endowment.
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Introduction
We investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an investment experiment where emotions are measured through self-reports. The choice problem concerns the distribution of an amount of money over a safe option and a risky option when there is a "global risk", that is, a chance of losing all earnings, from both options, including any return from the risky option. Our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option. This result cannot be explained by classical Expected Utility or by its main contenders Rank-Dependent Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. An explanation is offered by taking emotions into account, using the emotion data from the experiment and recent psychological findings.
To study the behavioral response to a global risk is not only of theoretical interest.
Global terrorism and political risk are phenomena that seem to make our study also empirically relevant. In the wake of September 11, 2001 , the specter of global terrorism has fostered feelings of insecurity, that anything can happen at any time, which cannot be escaped. This insecurity has nourished cautiousness and aversion to risky investment, at least in the short run (OECD, 2002; Samuelson, 2004) . Political risk in developing and transition economies is another case in point. Empirical evidence suggests that political instability due to social unrest and ownership risk related to a country's stability have a negative effect on private investment (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Bohn & Deacon, 2000) . 1 In general, of course, such risks may lead to the flight of capital to safer havens. However, foreign investment may not be a feasible option for many an investor in a developing or transition economy, because of high transaction costs or lack of access to foreign markets. 2 Finally, global risk could also be seen as the threat of a financial crisis. In that case both safe and risky investments could be at risk, for example due to severe financial market stress or a default of a major financial institution.
Another investment related aspect of our decision problem is that we have subjects distribute an amount of money over a safe option and a risky option, instead of confronting them with a binary choice as is common in the literature. 3 In this context, we study whether it makes a difference if the money is first earned by spending real effort or simply received as 1 A problem with field studies is that global (political) risk is hard to isolate. Moreover, these studies typically rely on cross-sectional data of countries that differ in many important ways (political system, tax regime, access to world markets, etc). In a laboratory experiment the degree of global risk can be carefully manipulated while keeping everything else constant, which offers the opportunity of control and replication. 2 Immediate consumption will often not be a realistic alternative either, and may even be negatively affected in case of a simultaneous loss in consumer confidence. 3 An exception is Loomes (1991) .
2 an endowment. There is some similarity here with the different positions of managers and owner-entrepreneurs. In large organizations investment generally takes place via the entitlement of managers to the use of a budget that does not necessarily bear a strong relationship with the manager's own past effort, in contrast with the owner-entrepreneur of a small business. To the extent that our experiment is valid in this respect, our finding that effort has a negative effect on investment has some relevance for policy since entrepreneurial activity is considered to be a significant factor in economic growth (see e.g. Libecap, 1999) .
To the best of our knowledge this is the first experimental study investigating this issue. 4 The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design, the theoretical predictions, and the experimental procedures. Results are given in section 3. Section 4 considers the relevance of emotions for explaining our results and offers some additional data. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
Theory and experiment
Decision problem and economic theory Baseline versus Global Risk
The decision problem we will investigate is as follows. People have an amount of money z at their disposal that they have to distribute over two options: they can invest an amount x (0 ≤ x ≤ z) in a risky option while leaving the remainder (z -x) for a safe option. For convenience, we will speak of investment only if the money is allocated to the risky option. The safe option yields neither a gain nor a loss, whereas the risky option gives a return of either 2.5x or 0, both with probability ½. We will compare this Baseline problem with the case where subjects know that after this game there will be a lottery determining with probability p that they can keep their earnings from the game while with probability 1-p everything will be lost. The latter case will be called Global Risk, because the probability 1-p applies equally to the earnings of both projects. The two cases are illustrated by the decision trees in figs. 1 and 2. Furthermore, classical EU predicts that investment will concentrate at x = z, while empirical applications of RDU and CPT allow for non-extreme investment.
Baseline versus Real Effort
The only difference between Real Effort and Baseline is that participants in the former experimental treatment first have to earn their money by doing an individual decision-making task on the computer, before any information about the subsequent part of the experiment (the investment game) is provided to them.
Theoretically, EU and RDU predict no change in investment behavior if earned money instead of an endowment is at stake, because bygones are bygones in these theories. The same prediction holds for CPT, unless Real Effort induces a change in reference point. If more 5 Regret theory (Loomes & Sugden, 1982 ) cannot be applied because it is restricted to binary choice situations.
For binary choice problems this theory predicts no effect of global risk (due to the "separability principle"). By adopting the assumption of dynamic consistency, also Loomes & Sugden's (1982) disappointment model would predict no effect. 6 Our analysis is based on calculations made by Peter Wakker. We are very grateful to Peter for making his analysis available to us. Of course, any error is solely our responsibility. subjects would now take z instead of 0 as reference point, a shift towards less risk seeking (less investment) would be predicted by this theory.
Unfortunately, there is no accepted theory of reference points that can be relied on for greater specificity. A prediction in this same direction of less investment can be obtained from the house money effect, which may be related to mental accounting (Thaler, 1985; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) . If participants in Baseline perceive the money they are endowed with as a windfall gain, then this effect would predict relatively more risk seeking in this treatment (see also Keasey & Moon, 1996, and Boylan & Sprinkle, 2001 ). 
Experimental procedures
The experiment was run at the CREED-laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. In total 139 subjects participated in the experiments. About 64% of the subjects were students of economics or econometrics. The other 36% were students from various fields such as chemistry, psychology, mathematics, and law. Subjects were randomly assigned to an experimental condition. The investment game was framed in a neutral way, avoiding which took half an hour extra).
We will first briefly discuss the procedures of Baseline and next indicate in which way the other experimental treatments differed. A summary of the sequence of events in the different treatments is given in table 1. Before subjects play the investment game in BL and receive instructions, they get an envelope containing 30 Dutch guilders in cash. Subjects are told that this is their working money with which they can earn more money but, possibly, also lose money. If their earnings turn out to be larger than 30 guilders, they get the difference paid out in private at the end of the experiment, on top of the 30 guilders they already received. If they make losses, they must pay these back to the experimenter -out of the 30 guilders they 7 Sunk-cost effects (Thaler, 1980; Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 1997) do not seem to be relevant here because subjects were already compensated for their opportunity costs in Real Effort. According to Thaler & Johnson (1990) Global Risk is set up in exactly the same way as BL except that now a global risk is introduced. All subjects receive a written announcement and a red die immediately after the handing over of the envelope with the money (but before they receive the instructions of the investment game). The announcement -which is also read aloud -states that with probability 1/3 the subject will lose all the earnings out of the experiment. It further states that this risk will be resolved by having the subject throw the red die at the end of the experiment (after having learned the outcome of the risky project but before payment; see Appendix B).
The only difference between Real Effort and BL concerns the way in which the 30 guilders are obtained. In RE this money is not given to subjects but has to be earned in 6 advance by doing a computerized task. Subjects receive the instructions of the investment game after they have completed the task. The task is an individual two-variable optimization task that takes about 30 minutes (see van Dijk et al., 2001 , for greater detail). It consists of 10 periods, where in each period subjects have to search for a maximum value. This maximum, which varies over the periods, can be imagined as the top of a mountain. The payoff for a period is related to the distance from the top at the end of the period, with a maximum of 3 guilders. The time limit has been chosen such that (almost) all subjects are able to find the maximum value within this limit. 8 Upon completion of the effort task subjects receive an envelope with their earnings in cash. Thereafter RE continues in precisely the same way as BL.
Emotions are measured through self-reports. According to Robinson & Clore (2002) , self-reports are the most common and potentially the best way to measure a person's emotional experience. As Bosman & van Winden (2002) , we use a list of emotion names and ask subjects to report the experienced intensity of each emotion on a 7-point scale, ranging from "no emotion at all" to "high intensity of the emotion". Subjects are asked to report their experienced emotions immediately after they have made their investment decision. 9 The list includes the following emotions: irritation, anger, anxiety, contempt, envy, hope, sadness, joy, happiness, shame, fear, and surprise. Note that not only the (negative) emotions are included that we expect to be particularly relevant in our setting (like anxiety or hope). When applying this technique, filler items are commonly used by psychologists to avoid that respondents are driven in a particular direction.
Results
Fig . 3 shows the distribution of investment in the risky project in Baseline. Investment ranges from 7 to 30 guilders, with large spikes at 20 (the mode and median) and 30 guilders.
Moreover, there are several smaller peaks at 10, 15, and 25 guilders. Thus, we do not observe the extreme investment predicted by classical EU. A majority of the subjects (75%) appears to be risk averse since they invest only part of their money in the risky project.
8 Only one subject in RE earned less than the maximum amount of 30 guilders (namely, 15 guilders). In the analysis, we have multiplied this subject's relative investment (investment/earnings) by 30. 9 The reason why we did not measure emotions before the decision is that we wanted to avoid any effect on the subsequent choice or the emotion measure after the decision since subjects may wish to give consistent answers. Also, people might find it odd to respond to the same questions more often in a short period of time. We first compare the above outcomes with the investment decisions by subjects who had to work for their money instead of receiving it as an endowment. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of money allocated to the risky project in this case of Real Effort.
Although the shape of the distribution is again an inverted-U, and the mode is again at 20, the mass of the distribution has shifted to the left, that is, towards less investment. This result goes against the (no shift) prediction of EU and RDU. However, the outcome is in line with CPT if, compared to Baseline, relatively more subjects in Real Effort had a reference point of 30. If subjects in Baseline perceived their money endowment as a windfall gain then also the house money effect could explain our finding. We will return to this issue below, to see whether we can say more about the underlying motivational factors. We next compare Baseline with Global Risk where subjects were confronted with a probability of 1/3 to lose all their earnings whatever investment decision they would make. Surprisingly, none of the economic theories discussed in the previous section can explain this result. Incidentally, this result also goes in the opposite direction of the common-ratio effect (an effect that can be explained by RDU and CPT). 12 Furthermore, it is at odds with the isolation effect discussed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) , which would predict no effect of global risk in our case. The underlying idea of this effect is that, as a decision heuristic, individuals may disregard components that alternatives share when mentally editing a decision problem. Although global risk is introduced in a way that would seem to facilitate isolation in the experiment, our findings suggest that this cognitive operation, if present at all, was not sufficiently strong. Hence, the question arises: what can explain our puzzling findings? In the next section we hope to show that taking account of the affective component of decision-making may provide the solution.
Emotions can explain
Emotions
Emotions occur if a stimulus is deemed to be relevant for one's interests or concerns (Frijda, 1986 ). This occurrence is unbidden, that is, one cannot simply choose an emotion. If the appraisal is that an interest is furthered, a positive emotion, like joy or gratitude, is triggered.
A negative emotion, like irritation or sadness, shows up if an interest is appraised to be thwarted. Emotions imply an action tendency (urge) to approach or avoid ("fight or flight").
Brain scientists have found that different neural networks in the limbic system (the feeling part of the brain) are involved, which interact with neural systems in the cortex (the thinking part of the brain). Emotional responses to external stimuli appear to be faster than cortical responses (LeDoux, 1996) . If the emotional intensity is sufficiently high, we just act without thinking. Emotions can be measured in various ways. Mostly used are self-reports of emotional intensity, like in our experimental design (Robinson & Clore, 2002) .
In economics there have been several theoretical attempts to relate emotions to decision making under risk and uncertainty. For example, in the 1980s Loomes & Sugden (1982 , 1986 and Bell (1982 Bell ( , 1985 formally analyzed regret and disappointment aversion.
More recently, Wu (1999) and Caplin & Leahy (2001) have developed a formalization of anxiety, while Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue in favor of a risk-as-feeling hypothesis with greater explanatory power than current cognitive-consequentialist approaches. So far, however, economists have neglected to study experimentally the role of emotions in decisionmaking under risk or uncertainty.
11 particular, negative emotions (Lazarus, 1991) . Consequently, if money is lost because of a bad investment outcome, the psychological cost (in terms of negative emotions like regret) will be higher in RE than in BL. On the other hand, the psychological benefit of a gain (in terms of positive emotions like joy) would not depend on effort so much. Thus, if subjects anticipate these emotions -for which substantial evidence exists 14 -one would expect them to invest less in RE, as we observed. Since our design concentrates on experienced anxiety related emotions, and not on anticipated regret or attachment, we can only add that we have indeed evidence of greater negative emotionality in case of RE. Even though investment is less in RE we find that subjects experienced more anger, after their investment decision but before the resolution of the investment risk, in this experimental treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.05), with anger being positively correlated with anxiety (Spearman rank-order coefficient:
0.51, p = 0.00).
Affect and Global Risk
An important feature of global risk is the threat of losing one's resources. This threat may be important when making an investment decision because of experienced emotions such as anxiety or fear that may interfere with other motivational factors. 15 Psychological evidence shows that experienced anxiety affects behavior and thoughts in systematic ways. For example, Raghunathan & Pham (1999) find that anxious individuals are biased towards lowrisk/low-reward options. Anxiety, they argue, primes an implicit goal of uncertainty reduction. Eisenberg et al. (1996) and Lerner & Keltner (2001) also find that anxiety and fear are correlated with risk-averse behavior. In their survey, Loewenstein et al. (2001) state:
"many studies have found effects of fear and anxiety on various types of judgement that tend to favor cautious, risk averse, decision making" (p.271). Thus, the available psychological literature strongly suggests that experienced anxiety motivates individuals to take less risk.
Although these studies typically rely on hypothetical outcomes (or deception) and induced emotions (not generated by the decision task itself), applied to our global risk experiment, they correctly predict and provide an explanation for our main finding that subjects invest less in the risky project.
14 See Zeelenberg et al. (1999) and Camille et al. (2004) 15 According to Ortony et al. (1988) anxiety is a fear-like emotion (like worry, apprehension, nervousness) that arises when the individual is displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event. The intensity depends on the degree to which the event is undesirable and the likelihood of the event. Unpleasantness, uncertainty, and situational (instead of individual) control are seen as central appraisal dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) .
For later reference, we will refer to this type of anxiety as situation anxiety because it is generated by the situation an individual is in, and not by that individual's own decisions.
The self-reports of the emotions subjects experienced immediately after their investment decision enable us to investigate more directly the role of anxiety and of other emotions in these decisions. The intensity scores of the emotions experienced in BL and GR are reported in table 2, where the reader should neglect the third column for the moment. The first column shows the scores for BL. 16 Among the negative emotions anxiety appears to be the most prominent one, followed by fear. But also some positive emotions obtain a relatively high score (in particular, hope). The second column of table 2 presents the data for GR. Again, anxiety comes out as the most prominently experienced negative emotion (now followed by irritation), while the same positive emotions show up as being important. Comparing the mean scores for BL and GR, we find no significant differences, except that irritation is higher in GR (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.04). At first sight, this may be surprising because one might have expected to see more anxiety in case of GR, given the role imputed to this type of emotion above. However, a closer investigation reveals that this mean score comparison is misleading. Firstly, there is a positive correlation between irritation and anxiety 16 The number of observations regarding emotions in BL is smaller than the number of observations concerning investment because about half of the subjects in BL reported their emotions at the very beginning of the experiment, before the instructions were given. We have pooled these two groups of subjects in the investment analysis because no significant differences in investment behavior were found (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.28; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.43). These emotions are not further considered here because none of them appeared to be correlated with investment behavior (Spearman rank-order coefficient, p > 0.10). This may be due to the fact that these subjects had not yet received any instructions about the experiment (the investment game).
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in GR (Spearman rank-order coefficient: 0.54, p = 0.00). This provides a first indication that anxiety plays a more prominent role in case of global risk, in particular, since irritation and anxiety are not correlated in BL (p = 0.94). Secondly, one should take into account the possibility of a two-way relationship between investment and anxiety, in the sense that investment in its turn may generate anxiety. In fact, this is the type of anxiety referred by Caplin & Leahy (2001) when they argue that "the incorporation of anxiety into asset pricing models may help explain both the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle" (p.56).
The intuition is that owning stocks involves an extra psychic cost, due to experienced anxiety, which increases the required return. By ignoring anxiety, conventional measures of risk aversion would underestimate the effect of uncertainty on asset prices. Returning to the experiment, it stands to reason that the more one invests in the risky project, the more is at stake, and the more one may worry before the resolution of the risk. We will call this kind of anxiety decision anxiety because it is generated by an individual's own decision. While situation anxiety has received substantial attention in the psychological literature, decision anxiety has been neglected in both economics and psychology, notwithstanding its importance due to the implied additional psychic cost of risk taking. This result has two important implications, which provide further support for the greater role of anxiety in GR. The first one is that the substantially lower investment level in GR would imply a lower level of decision anxiety in GR compared to BL. This can explain why similar mean scores for anxiety are observed, notwithstanding the presence of situation anxiety in 17 The coefficient of correlation is 0.33. 18 Furthermore, we find that anxiety is positively correlated to fear (Spearman rank-order coefficient: 0.68, p = 0.00), which shows that anxiety is a fear-like emotion (see footnote 15). Besides anxiety, contempt and hope are also positively related to the amount invested (p = 0.04 and p = 0.06, respectively).
GR. Due to the lower investment level, the similar scores in fact imply that anxiety per unit of investment has increased in GR. The second implication is that there is a two-way relationship between investment and anxiety in GR, which goes in opposite directions. On the one hand, investment is negatively related to situation anxiety because anxious individuals invest less.
On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between investment and decision anxiety because the more investment the more anxious people feel after their decision. Fig. 6 illustrates, where for simplicity linear relationships are assumed.
As a consequence of the counterbalancing effect of situation anxiety one should expect a less positive relationship between investment and anxiety in GR, because the anxiety scores are influenced by both kinds of anxiety. In fact, using again an ordered logit model, we find no relationship at all between investment and the anxiety scores in GR. (Moyer, 1976; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) . Irritation is an emotion related to anger that has been found to be conducive to risk seeking (Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Lerner & Keltner, 2001) . While fearful individuals show pessimistic risk perceptions and choices, angry individuals demonstrate relatively optimistic risk estimates and choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003) . Thus, it seems that two simultaneous action tendencies are at work in GR, which differentiates this case from
Baseline: more risk-aversion induced by situation anxiety and more risk seeking induced by irritation. Moreover, the observed correlation between anxiety and irritation shows that these conflicting action tendencies occur at the individual level. 20 To shed more light on this issue, we have run an extra experimental treatment with a larger global risk, which we discuss next.
Increasing the global risk
Instead of a global risk of 1/3, we will now investigate what happens if this risk is increased to 2/3 (that is, 1-p = 2/3 in fig. 2 ). We will call this case Global Risk High (GRH). Theoretically, this increase in the global risk should have no effect on our predictions in a directional sense (see section 2.1). Thus, if any behavioral effect at all, compared to Baseline, more risk seeking should be expected. Qualitatively, this is due to the fact that small probabilities of gaining something induce risk seeking in RDU and CPT. Fig. 7 shows the distribution of investment in GRH. The distribution appears to be different from both Baseline and Global
Risk. In line with GR, we observe again a U-shaped distribution with one mode at 10 and another at the extreme level of 30. However, the latter is now the larger one, and overall there seems to be a shift towards more risk seeking. Average investment (18.4; st. dev.: 9.2; median is 18) is still smaller than investment in Baseline, but now no longer significantly so (MannWhitney test, p = 0.29; t test, p=0,24). It would be misleading, however, to conclude that the behavioral outcomes are similar to BL. First of all, the average investment level is not significantly different from, and in fact a bit closer to, the average in GR (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.51; t test, p = 0.52). Furthermore, the shape of the distribution of investment looks more similar to the one in GR (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.99). Finally, the range of investment is To see whether affect can also offer an explanation for this finding, we consider the intensity scores for emotions experienced in GRH, presented in the third column of table 2. A rough comparison with BL and GR reveals that subjects were more surprised, less happy, and less hopeful. Among the negative emotions, it is no longer anxiety but irritation that gets the highest score. Next in rank is anxiety, but this emotion is now closely followed by anger.
Whereas, compared to BL, only irritation is stronger in GR, now in addition more anger and surprise is observed. 21 These results point at higher emotional arousal in case of GRH. Again, no difference in average experienced anxiety is found. However, anger and irritation are both highly correlated with anxiety (Spearman rank-order coefficients: anger: 0.90, p = 0.00; irritation: 0.78, p = 0.00), which provides indirect evidence of anxiety being more prominent in GRH than in BL. Comparing GRH with GR, it turns out that subjects in GRH experienced 21 Anger and irritation show a correlation coefficient of 0.82 (Spearman rank-order coefficient, p = 0.00).
more anger and surprise (Mann-Whitney tests, p = 0.00 and p = 0.01, respectively). In addition, they appeared to be marginally less happy (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.07). Finally, as in GR, no correlation is found between the amount invested and the anxiety experienced after the investment decision.
RESULT 6. In terms of emotions, the main differences between Global Risk and Global Risk
High are that more anger and surprise are experienced in the latter.
Since we have seen that anger is conducive to risk taking, Result 6 can explain why we observe a shift towards more investment in GRH, compared to investment in GR.
Furthermore, the importance of anger in GRH, where the global risk is much higher, seems consistent with the view that certainty (next to individual control) is a central appraisal dimension distinguishing anger from fear (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) .
Discussion
Main finding and explanation. The experimental results reported in this paper present a puzzle to expected utility as well as non-expected utility models. None of these models correctly predicts the decrease in investment due to global risk, that is, a risk that cannot be avoided whatever one does. The missing piece appears to be the contribution that emotions make to human decision making, besides cognitive factors as captured by CPT. More specifically, our results point at the influence of two emotions: anxiety and irritation, where in case of the former a distinction has to be made between situation anxiety and decision anxiety. Whereas decision anxiety is generated by an individual's own decisions (like investment), situation anxiety is induced by the setting that the individual is brought into or confronted with. Anxiety is an avoidance type of emotion with a negative hedonic value and an action tendency to take less risk. The former implies that anticipated decision anxiety will provide an additional stimulus to invest less. On the other hand, global risk appears to produce irritation. This emotion too has a negative hedonic value but it differs from anxiety in being an approach type of emotion with an action tendency to take more risks. Because the setting of global risk adds situation anxiety as well as irritation to the decision anxiety which plays a role in Baseline, the outcome in terms of average investment can in principle go in either 18 direction, that is, it may lead to more or less investment depending on which action tendency is stronger. In this way we can explain our surprising finding of a decrease in investment.
However, as the outcome of our additional experimental treatment with higher global risk (showing more risk seeking) foreshadows, higher average investment cannot be excluded, in general. What is of further interest in this context is that these counteracting emotional forces affect the shape of the distribution of investment, from an inverted-U shape to a U-shaped distribution. Incidentally, this demonstrates a limitation of the common procedure to offer subjects binary choices, which cannot reveal such an effect.
Related studies. In their taxonomy of dynamic choice problems, focusing on the well-known common ratio effect, Cubitt et al. (1998) consider some cases that bear a relationship with our global risk problem. The relationship is due to the introduction of a common factor (a loss probability common to all available options) at a particular stage of the decision problem.
More particularly, these problems concern a binary choice between a safe option and a risky option with either the resolution of the common factor risk taking place before the choice is made ("prior lottery" problem) or after this choice is made but before the risk of the risky option is resolved ("precommitment" problem). 22 Note that in our case subjects are not restricted to a binary choice while the resolution of the global risk takes place after the risk of the risky project is resolved. Interestingly, Cubitt et al. do not find a significant behavioral difference between the precommitment problem and the "scaled-up" problem without a common factor, in line with the original finding of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) . 23 In fact, there is a good deal of evidence that the common ratio effect (more risk seeking) disappears in that case (Davis & Holt, 1993; Starmer, 2000) . This is imputed to the greater transparency in the precommitment problem compared to the reduced lottery, where the common factor is multiplied by the choice probabilities and for which the common ratio effect is found. It seems that subjects are able to cognitively isolate the common factor in the precommitment problem, as proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) .
However, from this vantage point our, say, post lottery results are hard to explain, because in our design the global risk or common factor seems very clearly separated from the investment game (see table 1 and the Instructions in Appendix B). Therefore, it seems interesting to investigate whether in the precommitment problem emotions may have caused the absence of the common ratio effect. We offer three possible explanations.
Firstly, in these experiments the size of the global risk is in the range of our Global
Risk High treatment, where we found no significant difference in the average investment level compared to Baseline (which is similar to the scaled-up problem). Thus, the explanation in terms of emotions that we offered for this case may also be relevant for the precommitment problem. Note, however, that our findings concerning Baseline and Global Risk High differed in several respects, related to the shape of the distribution of investment, which cannot be observed for the precommitment problem because of the restriction to binary choices.
Secondly, in this case hope instead of anxiety may have been primarily induced by the global risk. That is, hope to get successfully through the stage where the global risk is resolved, to enter the stage where the return on investment is determined. Whereas acute anxiety motivates to reduce risks and affects the way information is processed, no such biases appear to be associated with hope (Lazarus, 1991 (Lazarus, , 1999 . If so, the experience of hope may not disturb the cognitive assessment of risks in any systematic way. According to Ortony et al. (1988) the difference between hope and anxiety is that the former is elicited by being pleased about the prospect of a desirable event while the latter is triggered by being displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event. Now, if in the precommitment problem subjects focus more on the desirable aspect of going to the next (investment return) stage than on the undesirable aspect of not going to that stage, hope rather than anxiety will be elicited.
Finally, it may be that the risk of no continuation is sufficient to induce acute anxiety.
The related action tendency to take less risk, however, may be counteracted by the influence of another (anticipated) emotion: regret. Because in the precommitment problem there is a chance that the consequences of one's investment choice will not be revealed at all, less negative emotion may be anticipated than in the scaled-up problem. This would induce individuals to take more risk in the precommitment problem. If these two opposite forces more or less balance, the net result is that behavior will not be different.
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Topics for future research. Examining risk behavior under different affective conditions, focusing on specific emotions (e.g. regret or hope) while keeping in mind that decisions 24 Acute anxiety may also be the triggered in experiments applying the random lottery incentive system. With this procedure a random draw after a decision task involving a sequence of lotteries determines which lottery is played for real, which creates a layer of uncertainty. Incidentally, this may explain why Loomes (1991) finds a reverse common ratio effect in his experiment, concerning reduced lotteries, where this procedure is applied.. Another, more complicated choice study finding a reverse common ratio effect is Cubitt & Sugden (2001 different from the values (1/3 and 2/3) studied in this paper. Because decisions appear to be more sensitive to the possibility than the probability of a negative outcome, raising the probability of losing everything from zero to some small positive number may have a larger effect than changes within some midrange.
Another issue worthwile to be investigated is to what extent "cooling off" is possible if a decision can be delayed. In many situations people do not immediately have to make a decision. By postponing the decision emotions might perhaps cool off. On the other hand, it may very well be the case that emotions would show up (again) once one actually has to make the decision.
Regarding the behavioral consequences of anxiety, an interesting topic concerns the temporal pattern of this emotion. Psychological evidence suggests that the emotional intensity is U-shaped with respect to time. The initial reaction of an individual to some salient threat is generally intense anxiety which then decreases for a while up to some point where the anticipation of the threatening event fuels the emotion again (Loewenstein et al., 2001 ). This would suggest that the behavioral effects are particularly likely to show up directly after an individual learns about the threat and immediately prior to the realization of the threat, with perhaps little or no effects in between.
Finally, regarding the effect of effort, an interesting extension would be to allow for leveraged investment, which could weaken the link between the endowment and own past effort even more. Empirically, this issue seems very relevant as investors, such as hedge funds or private equity houses, use large sums of borrowed (cheap) money to finance their activities.
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(lower) p-branch of the decision tree in fig. 2 when doing the certainty equivalent substitution at the upper (lower) chance node 2 (3), and τ 1 (τ 2 ) the decision weight of the upper (lower) ½-probability branch at the left chance node. Under RDU and CPT with reference point 0 these parameters are independent of x. Then, using the first-order derivative, people do not want to invest less if the following condition holds:
where ρ 1 = ρ 2 = w(p), τ 1 = w(½) and τ 2 = 1 -w(½). Consequently, the RHS of (2) is independent of p, which means that global risk does not affect investment. Under CPT with reference point z, the situation is more complex. In that case, the lower chance node 3 is processed as a loss, while ρ 2 = λ(1 -w
−
(1-p)) and τ 2 = λw − (½). When folding back at the upper chance node 2, the upper branch yielding z + 1.5x is a gain and ρ 1 = w + (p). The upper ½-probability branch at the left chance node 1 can be processed as a gain or a loss, depending on whether the upper lottery is more or less favourable than z. At the critical probability (where this lottery is equivalent to z) decreasing p leads to a sudden λ-times more weighting, at node 1, of the upper ½ branch, which will enhance investment. Thus, at this critical probability it may happen that decreasing p (increasing global risk) leads to more investment.
Furthermore, as increasing x reduces the critical probability, while a higher p induces lower investment and increases the critical probability, there is a tendency for x to reach a level where the probability is critical. Above and below the critical probability, the parameters ρ 1 , ρ 2 , τ 1 , and τ 2 are independent of x, and ρ 2 /ρ 1 varies proportionally with λ(1 -w − (1-p))/w + (p), which is not likely to vary much with p under the usual assumption of an inverse-S relationship for w + and w − . For, in that case, w − is approximately the dual of w + (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) . Hence, the prediction is that outside the critical probability global risk will not affect investment much.
